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Commentc1ry

Billboards, Aesthetics,
and the First Amendment:
Municipal Sign Regulation
After Metromedia
By Alan Weinstein*

In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981), 33 ZD 238, the U.S. Supreme Court, although
sharply divided, held that states and municipalities could
regulate signs and billboards to reduce traffic hazards and
improve a community's appearance, but cautioned that
regulations which imposed too many restrictions on pro
tected First Amendment rights to freedom of speech would
be struck down. The nine Supreme Court justices wrote five
separate opinions in Metromedia, struggling to find a work
able accommodation between free speech guarantees and the
deference normally granted to a municipality's exercise of
the police power. 1 This article, after considering the opin
ions written in Metromedia, f~cuses on the cases that have
relied on that decision to judge the validity of state and
municipal sign/billboard regulations, seeking to gain a bet
ter understanding of Metromedia by analyzing its applica
tion by state and federal courts.

Metromedia
In 1972, the city of San Diego adopted an ordinance that
banned all off-site "outdoor advertising displays," but per
mitted on-site signs and signs falling within 12 specified
categories. 2 The stated purpose of the ordinance was "to
eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought
about by distracting sign displays" and "to preserve and
improve the appearance of the City." Outdoor advertising
companies sued in state court to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance, charging that it would eliminate their
businesses-a charge that the city later agreed was accurate.
The trial court held that the ordinance was unconstitu
tional and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, but these
courts were reversed by the California Supreme Court. 3 It
held that the two purposes of the ordinance were within the
city's legitimate interests and that the ordinance was a proper
application of the city's zoning power to promote public
safety and welfare. The court rejected the advertisers' claim
*Alan Weinstein is a professor of law at Touro College School of Law and
author of The Reemergence of Nuisance Law in Environmental Litigation,
which appeared in the March issue of WL&ZD,
l. Municipalities are generally free to place reasonable "time, place, or
manner" restrictions on signs-such as setback requirements-but prob
lems may occur in judging whether an ordinance merely regulates the "time,
place, or manner" of speech or impermissibly regulates speech content. Since
almost any regulation other than a total ban may be construed as a "time,
plaee, or manner" restriction, courts look behind the recitation of these words
to search for regulations that address content or otherwise improperly
infringe on protected speech.

i. Sa~ Diego Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series), enacted March 14,
1972. Among the 12 exempted categories were: signs erected by or for govern
mental regulation, historical plaques, religious symbols, for sale/rent signs,
and temporary political signs.
3. Metromedia, Inc v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d-407 (Cal. 1980).
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that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The adver
tisers were then granted review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Five Opinions of Metromedia
The Court produced five separate opinions in Metromedia,
no more than four justices agreeing on any one view of the
case. In addition to the four;member plurality opinion by
Justice White, there was a concurring opinion by Justice
Brennan (joined by Justice Blackmun) and separate dissent
ing opinions by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger. The inability of a majority of the Court to
agree on why the San Diego ordinance was invalid made
the case difficult to understand and left a number of impor
tant unresolved issues for lower courts to interpret.
Justice White's plurality opinion distinguished between the
effects of the ordinance on commercial and noncommercial
speech. For its impact on commercial speech, the ordinance
was judged on the basis of a four-part test first announced
by the Court in Central Hudson v. Public Service Commis
sion, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 4 Under Central Hudson:
• Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment
only if it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
This was not an issue in Metromedia.
• The governmental interest served by the ordinance must
be substantial. The plurality readily found San Diego's
twin goals-traffic safety and the appearance of the
city-to be substantial governmental interests.
• The Court then must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted. The
advertisers had argued that San Diego should be required
to prove there was a connection between billboards and
traffic safety. The plurality rejected their claim, finding
that a legislative judgment that billboards are traffic haz
ards, based on the legislature's observation that the pur
pose of billboards is to distract a driver's attention, is not
manifestly unreasonable and should not be set aside. In
light of conflicting scientific evidence on the issue, no
proof is needed other than "the accumulated, common
sense judgm.ents of local lawmakers and of the many
reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial
hazards to traffic safety:' The plurality reached a similar
result with respect to the city's aesthetic interests, recog
nizing that "billboards by their very nature, wherever
4. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 1942 case, Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), announced that "the Constitution imposes no ... res
traint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. 316 U.S.
at 54. Over the next 30 years, the Court slowly moved away from its deci
sion in Valentine, finding that commercial speech could have some First
Amendment protection in particular circumstances.
A number of separate cases decided in the mid-1970s established the
Court's current views on the differing degrees of First Amendment protec
tion for commercial and noncommercial speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975), a case involving newspaper advertisement of abortion serv
ices, the Court ruled that commercial activity could not justify narrowing
of First Amendment protection. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Community Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court struck
down a statute prohibiting advertising by pharmacists, but noted that there
is a "common sense" difference between political speech, which would receive
the full extent of Constitutional protection, and commercial speech, which
requires a "different degree of protection.·
This distinction between the different degrees of protection, while never
precisely defined, clearly affords commercial speech a more limited mea
sure of protection, thus allowing it to be regulated in ways that would be
impermissible if applied to noncommercial speech.
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located and however constructed can be perceived as
'esthetic harm.' "s
'
• The restriction should be no more extensive than is
necessary to serve the substantial governmental interests
asserted. The plurality argued that since the city had
shown a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are
traffic hazards and unattractive, the most direct and effec
tive way to solve these problems is to ban billboards. Since
the ordinance did not totally ban billboards-it permit
ted all on-site commercial signs and exempted 12 other
categories from the ordinance-San Diego had clearly
gone no further than necessary in seeking to achieve its
goals.
The plurality's Central Hudson analysis also noted the dis
tinction in the ordinance between off-site (prohibited) and
on-site (permitted) commercial signs, and agreed that a
municipality may reasonably conclude that both businesses
and the public have a stronger interest in identifying busi
ness locations and advertising the products or services avail
able there than the municipality has in regulating signs. The
plurality therefore found that the San Diego ordinance met
the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson for
regulating commercial speech.
The plurality took a different view of the restrictions on
noncommercial speech. Because the ordinance permitted on
site commercial signs, but prohibited on-site noncommercial
signs, San Diego had impermissibly given greater protection
to commercial messages than it gave to noncommercial mes
sages. The exemptions in the ordinance for certain noncom
mercial signs also posed constitutional problems because it
allowed the city to distinguish between various noncommer
cial signs depending on their content. Further, the plurality
rejected San Diego's argument that the ordinance was no
more than a reasonable regulation of the "time, place, or
manner" of speech because it banned off-site billboards
entirely and distinguished between on-site signs by looking
at the content of the speech: Was the sign commercial or an
exempted noncommercial sign?
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Blackmun joined,
concurred with the plurality in finding the ordinance uncon
stitutional but, unlike the plurality, did so because he believed
the practical effect of the ordinance was to eliminate bill
boards altogether. For Brennan, such a total ban on a
medium of communication-outdoor advertising billboards
-requires an analysis different from that used by the plural
ity. Instead of relying on the exceptions to the ban to invali
date the ordinance, Brennan found the ordinance defective
because the city had failed to provide adequate justification
for such substantial restriction on protected speech. While
agreeing with the substantiality of the city's interest in traffic
safety, Brennan noted that the city failed to provide evidence
demonstrating that billboards actually impair traffic safety
in San Diego. The city also failed to show that removal of
billboards from the commercial and industrial areas of San
Diego would improve the appearance of those areas suffi
ciently to justify the intrusion on protected speech .
Brennan and Blackmun also disagreed with the plurality's
view that an ordinance totally banning commercial bill
boards, but allowing noncommercial billboards, would be
constitutional. Such an ordinance, they argued, by giving
5. 453 U.S. at 509-510.

city officials the right-before approving a billboard-to
determine whether the proposed message is commercial or
noncommercial, ". . . presents a real danger of curtailing
noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commer
cial speech.''6
Chief Justice Burger's vehement dissent assailed the Court's
invalidating the ordinance as "bizarre" and "[r ]elying on sim
plistic platitudes.'' Burger felt the ruling left cities to choose
between two unsatisfactory options: "(a) allowing all 'non
commercial' signs, no matter how many, how dangerous, or
how damaging to the environment; or (b) forbidding signs
altogether.'' Burger, by contrast, saw no reason to invalidate
a city's effort to restrict "these traffic hazards and eyesores"
simply because, in exercising rational legislative judgment,
it has chosen to permit a narrow class of signs that meet spe
cial needs. In his view, the San Diego ordinance did not
attempt to "suppress any particular point of view or any
category of messages ..."; nor did the regulation of bill
boards infringe on freedom of expression, given the wide
range of alternative media available.
Both the Burger and Stevens dissents criticized the plurality
for focusing its attention on the exceptions in the ordinance
and thus, somewhat ironically, concluding that "the
ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgment of speech
because it does not abridge enough speech.'' Stevens agreed
with Brennan and Blackmun that the potential effect of the
San Diego ordinance would be the elimination of outdoor
advertising billboards. Therefore, he believed the principal
question presented by this case is whether a city may pro
hibit this medium of communication. It may, Stevens says,
arguing that the billboard ban is permissible because there
is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the city's actions
and because there is no reason to believe that the market
remaining open for communication is inadequate.
In a short dissent, Justice Rehnquist, agreeing substantially
with the opinions voiced by the Chief Justice and Justice
Stevens, made two additional observations. First, he stated
that aesthetics alone is sufficient to sustain a legislative pro
hibition on billboards and disagreed with Justice Brennan's
call for cities to offor proof to reviewing courts of the con
nection between a billboard ban and aesthetic improvement.
Second, he termed the Court's treatment of the subject to
be "a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive prin
ciples can be clearly drawn.''
The Effect of Metromedia's Opinions
While considerably short of "definitive principles," certain
propositions could be gleaned from the five Metromedia
opinions:
• Aesthetic considerations are, by themselves, a sufficient
basis for an exercise of the police power to regulate signs
and billboards.
• When a municipality determines that billboards are
"traffic hazards and eyesores;' it need not offer evidence
to support those findings in court. (Brennan and Black
mun disagree).
6. Brennan questioned how city officials would deal with the follow
ing series of billboards in deciding which ones to permit. The first billboard
reads: "Visit Joe's lee Cream Shoppe"; the second, "Joe's lee Cream Shoppe
uses only the highest quality dairy products"; the third, "Because Joe thinks
that dairy products are good for you, please shop at Joe's Shoppe"; and
the fourth, "Joe says to support dairy price supports: they mean lower prices
for you at his shoppe:' 453 U.S. at 538.
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• A municipality may distinguish between on-site and off
site signs.
• A municipality may prohibit off-site commercial bill
boards.
• Noncommercial signs may not be regulated more strin
gently than commercial signs.
Two other critical issues are far less clear:
• The difference between commercial and noncommercial
signs remains difficult to discern, a point strongly empha
sized in Justice Brennan's opinion.
• It is not clear whether a majority of the Court would
uphold a total ban on all billboards, both commercial and
noncommercial. The dissenting Justices would clearly
uphold a total ban. Justices Brennan and Blackmun, while
seeming to support a total ban, would subject the munic
ipality to a test so strict that few cities are likely to pass
muster: proof that a sufficiently substantial governmental
interest is directly furthered by the total ban, and proof
that no more narrowly drawn restriction would promote
the achievement of that goal as well as a total ban. The
plurality opinion appears internally contradictory on the
total ban question. It implies that all billboards may be
banned: "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it
cannot choose to limit their content to commercial mes
sages ... ;'but then states that although they do not indi
cate whether such a ban would be permissible, there were
constitutional problems created by a total prohibition of
a particular expressive forum (live entertainment) in Schad
v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), 33 ZD
254. Chief Justice Burger interpreted this latter statement
as a not-too-subtle hint that the plurality would strike
down a total ban on all signs.
Developments in Sign Control Since Metromedia
Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its opin
ion in City Council of l.JJs Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
(Vincent), 52 u.s:L.w. 4594(May15, 1984), upholding a Los
Angeles ordinance banning the posting of signs on public
property. Vincent, the first Supreme Court pronouncement
on sign control since Metromedia, is one of approximately
25 reported cases decided under the Metromedia ruling. On
the whole, these decisions favor municipal efforts to place
strict controls on signs to further aesthetic and other goals.
At the same time, Justice Brennan's call for strict court scru
tiny of government sign regulations that raise First Amend
ment issues-a plea he renews in Vincent-has been used
by some courts to strike down ordinances that intrude upon
freedom of speech to achieve questionable or unsubstantiated
government goals.

Vincent
In Vincent, a majority of the Court held that a Los Angeles
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property
was constitutional. Justice Stevens' opinion reaffirmed the
conclusion of a majority of the Justices in Metromedia that
a city's aesthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to pro
vide an acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohi
bition against a particular form of expression.
Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los
Angeles city council in 1979. A group of his supporters,
Taxpayers for Vincent, rontracted with a political sign serv6
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ice company, Candidates Outdoor Graphics Service, to
produce and post on utility poles 15 X 44 inch cardboard
signs reading: "Roland Vincent-City Council:' Posting signs
on public property was prohibited by the municipal code;
accordingly, city street maintenance employees routinely
removed all signs attached to utility poles and other objects
covered by the ordinance, including the Vincent signs.
The Vincent supporters and the sign company challenged
the ban. The federal district court upheld the city's position,
but the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, declar
ing the ordinance unconstitutional? Citing Brennan's con
curring opinion in Metromedia, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the city had failed to show that its asserted interests in aes
thetics and minimizing traffic hazards were substantial
enough to warrant a total ban on posting signs on public
property, a prohibition that the Ninth Circuit believed ren
dered the ordinance presumptively unconstitutional because
significant First Amendment issues were involved. Los
Angeles appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Stevens
acknowledged that the ordinance raised a First Amendment
issue, but disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's finding that the
ordinance should be presumed invalid. Stevens noted that
no one claimed the city used the ordinance to suppress cer
tain ideas or that it was applied in anything but an even
handed manner, absent any hint of bias or censorship. Any
regulation that is neutral as to the content of speech will be
;ustified, Stevens noted, if it is within the constitutional
power of the government, if it furthers a substantial govern
ment interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and if any incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than necessary to accomplish the
government interest. This standard of review for a content
neutral regulation was stated in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
In this case, Stevens argued, there was no dispute that it
was within the constitutional power of the city to attempt
to improve its appearance and that this interest is basically
unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Further, just as in
Metromedia, the city's aesthetic interests were substantial
enough to justify a content-neutral prohibition against a ''sub
stantive evil": billboards in Metromedia; here "the visual
assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an
accumulation of signs posted on public property:' This nar
rowed the Court's inquiry to whether the ordinance's effect
on expression was no greater than necessary to accomplish
the city's purpose.
The majority answered this question in the affirmative,
considering the ordinance's incidental restriction on expres
sion justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place,
or manner of expression. Citing the district court's findings
that there were ample alternative modes of communication
in Los Angeles, the majority rejected the claim that posting
political signs on public property is a uniquely valuable or
important mode of communication. While acknowledging
that the Court has shown special concern for inexpensive
forms of expression that are important to a large segment
of the public. the majority noted that there were ·'practical
boundaries· to such concern.
The majority also rejected arguments that the Los Angeles
7. Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of City Council, 682 F.2d 847 (9th
Gr. 1982).
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ordinance was either underinclusive-because it failed to
apply equally to all unattractive signs wherever located-or
could have been more narrowly written to lessen its effect
on expression, again citing the rejection of similar claims
in the Metromedia decision.
The majority concluded that ·the evidence in this case
established that the city had a sufficiently substantial
i~terest-aesthetics-to justify its "content neutral, impar
tially administered prohibition against the posting of
appellees' temporary signs on public property and that such
an application of the ordinance does not create an unaccept
a?le threat to the "profound national commitment to the prin
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open:" (Citation omitted.)
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Marshall, both echoes and amplifies his earlier call for strict
judicial scrutiny when government asserts aesthetic interests
to justify its regulation of forms of expression. Brennan
rejects the majority's view that the ordinance merely regu
lates the "time, place, or manner" of expression, claiming
that "signs posted on public property are doubtless 'essen
tial to the poorly financed causes of little people:" (Citation
omitted.) Brennan finds that their prohibition constitutes a
total ban on an important medium of communication
requiring the Court to "examine with particular care th;
justifications that the City proffers for its ban:'
In such cases, the Court should first determine whether
the ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech,
and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies
the suppression. If the ordinance is neutral as to content
Brennan agrees with the majority that the court's prope;
task is to determine whether the governmental objective
advanced by the restriction is substantial, and whether the
r~striction is no greater than is essential to further that objec
tive. But Brennan is skeptical of a reviewing court's ability
to undertake this analysis where a purely aesthetic objec
tive is asserted to justify a restriction on speech.
Brennan argues that aesthetic judgments are so subjective
that they raise problems for judicial review that are not
presented by laws defended on more objective grounds, "such
as national security, public health, or public safety:' Thus,
when aesthetics is asserted to justify restrictions on expres
sion, a court will initially face substantial difficulties deter
mining whether the actual objective is related to the
suppression of speech. Brennan notes, for example, that in
this case, Los Angeles could be pursing either its stated
objective-elimination of "visual clutter'~or a second
objective-the elimination of the messages typically carried
by the signs. While the first objective is lawful, the second
clearly is not; yet the city, Brennan asserts, might easily mask
the second objective by simply asserting the first.
To address this concern, and the others raised by the inher
ent subjectivity of aesthetic judgments, Brennan proposes
a test for judging the legitimacy and substantiality of a
municipality's aesthetic objectives: Courts should require a
municipality to demonstrate that it is pursuing a compre
hensive program of aesthetic improvement and specifically
doing so in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of
speech. Without such a demonstration, Brennan would
invalidate ''aesthetic'' regulations that restrict expression.
Brennan offers three reasons why this test would ensure
that governmental regulation of aesthetics does not violate

the FiiSt Amendment:
First,;we would have a reasonably reliable indication that it
is not.the oontent or communicative aspect of speech that the
gqvernment finds unaesthetic. Seeond, when a restriction of
speech is part of a comprehensive and seriously pursued pro
gram to promote an aesthetic objective, we have a more reli
able indication of the government's own assessment of the
substa:ntiality,_of its objective. And finally, when an aesthetic
objective is pursued on more than one front, we have a bet
ter basis upon which to ascertain its precise nature and thereby
determine whether the means selected are the least restrictive
ones for achieving the objective. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4605.

Applying his test to this case, Brennan would require Los
Angeles to demonstrate that it is pursuing its goal of eliminat
ing visual clutter in a serious and comprehensive manner.
Most importantly, Los Angeles must show that it is pursu
ing its aesthetic objectives through programs other th~ its
ban on signs, that at least some of those programs do nc£
restrict speech, and that the programs parallel the sign ban
in their stringency, geographical scope, and aesthetic focus.
In this case, however, there was no indication that the city
had addressed its visual clutter problem in any way other
than by prohibiting the posting of signs. Therefore, Justice
Brennan would invalidate the ordinance.
The Vincent case greatly clarifies the positions of the
Justices regarding municipal sign control regulations that
raise First Amendment issues. Six members of the Court will
clearly defer to a legislative enactment that incidentally re
stricts freedom of expression in pursuit of aesthetic objec
tives, as long as the municipality does not appear to be
judging speech on the basis of its content or restricting a form
of expression for which there are no adequate alternatives.a
By contrast, the minority view articulated by Justice Bren
nan calls for strict scrutiny of any governmental restriction
on speech justified on aesthetic grounds. The minority would
require citi.es to meet an objective standard of proof before
approving aesthetic regulations that restrict expression.
There has been a substantial volume of municipal sign con
trol litigation reported in the three years since the Metro
media decision. Although most of the decisions generally
support sign control efforts, there have been a number of
instances where courts have struck down ordinances because
of their intrusion on freedom of expression. In the remainder
of this article, we will analyze these sign control decisions
to see how the courts are applying Metromedia and com
ment on what changes (if any) the Vincent decision may
produce. Finally, we will use this analysis to guide planners
seeking to regulate signs and billboards lawfully.
Using Aesthetics to Sustain Sign Controls
Since Metromedia, there has been a marked acceleration of
the trend towards courts' upholding an exercise of the police
power based solely on aesthetics. In 1982 alone, the highest
courts in Florida, New Mexico, and North Carolina all held
that.sign control measures could be instituted solely for aes
thetic purposes. The Supreme Court of Georgia relied on
Metromedia to hold that aesthetics alone was a sufficient
basis for an ordinance prohibiting structures in front yards,
8. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc, Inc v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977), 29 ZD 245. Township ban on "for salen signs struck down, in
part because alternative means of communicating information on the sale
of homes were unsatisfactory.
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in this case, a satellite television antenna.9 In 1983, the
Arkansas Supreme Court specifically noted "the strong trend"
towards justifying regulations for aesthetic purposes in
upholding a comprehensive ordinance regulating signs. City
of Fayetteville v. Mcilroy Bank & Trust Co., 647 S.W.2d 439
(Ark. 1983).
The trend, while strong, is decidedly not universal. The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed that while
a municipality may include consideration of aesthetic fac
tors in the exercise of its zoning power, "our Supreme Court
has held that aesthetics cannot justify zoning decisions:'
White Advertising Metro v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 453 A.2d
29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), 35ZD157. Ohio similarly reaffirmed
that although aesthetics may be used as a basis for regula
tion where other factors are considered, it cannot alone sus
tain an exercise of the police power. Norton Outdoor
Advertisingv. Village of Arlington Heights, 433N.E.2d198
(Ohio 1982), 34 ZD 191.
A number of decisions have struck down sign controls on
First Amendment grounds where the regulations' aesthetic
objectives were deemed either insubstantial or wholly unsub
stantiated by the court. Some of these decisions relied
strongly on the arguments advanced by Justice Brennan in
Metromedia and must now be questioned in light of the
Supreme Court's clear rejection of the Brennan position in
Vincent. The best example of the need to reconsider these
lower court cases is, of course, the Vincent decision itself,
where the Ninth Circuit had cited Justice Brennan's concur
ring opinion in Metromedia to support its invalidation of
the Los Angeles ordinance but was later overruled by a
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Another case requiring reconsideration is Southern New
Jersey Newspapers v. State of New Jersey, 542 F. Supp. 173 •
(D.N.J. 1982). There, roadside newspaper vending machines
were to be removed under authority of the state's highway
advertising act because they carried signs identifying the
newspapers for sale inside the machines. The court applied
the same standards used by the Supreme Court majority in
Vincent to test a content-neutral regulation: The statute must
further a substantial government interest and must be nar
rowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion on freedom of
expression. The court readily found that the act's stated
purposes-traffic safety and aesthetics-are worthwhile and
substantial state goals, but, relying on Brennan's concurring
opinion in Metromedia for support, required the state to pro
vide adequate evidence that removing the newspaper vend
ing machines would directly further the asserted state
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. The evidence
presented, photographs of vending machines, could not meet
their test. In the court's view, the photographs showed the
machines to be surrounded by so many other unsightly
objects that it was not evident to the court that removal of
the machines ..will improve the appearance of each area to
such an extent that the abridgment of First Amendment
rights is justified:' 542 F.Supp. at 186. Accordingly, the court
declared the highway advertising act unconstitutional as
applied to prohibit the newspaper vending machines.
9. See City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising Association, 414 So.2d
1030 (Fla. 1982), 34 ZD 322; Temple Baptist Church v. City of Albuquer
que, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982); North Carolina v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675
(N.C. 1982); Gouge v. City of Snellville, 287 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1982), 34 ZD
205.
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It is doubtful that the decision would be upheld in light
of the opinion in Vincent. Both cases involve content-neutral
regulations that seek to achieve aesthetic and traffic safety
objection. Both cases involve regulations that, as applied,
restricted protected forms of expression: political signs and
newspapers. Since Vinc.ent held that there was no need for
government to demonstrate the connection between the regu
lation and the objective it sought to achieve, it would appear
to overrule the finding of the court in Southern New Jersey
Newspapers that such proof is required.10
Although Vincent makes clear that government need not
demonstrate that sign controls will achieve an aesthetic objec
tive, a federal Court of Appeals case, Dills v. City of
Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982), 34 ZD 204, points
up the need for aesthetic objectives to be clearly stated.
Marietta, Georgia, required the removal of portable signs
after a specified number of days. When challenged by Dills,
a sign supplier, the city argued that its regulations had been
enacted to further traffic safety and aesthetics. The court
agreed that these were substantial government interests, but
found no support for the claim that city officials had been
concerned about aesthetics when enacting the regulations.
The court noted that the Marietta Sign Ordinance did not
mention aesthetics at all and its statement of purpose was
so broad_.!'to safeguard life, public health, property and wel
fare .. :'._as to "frustrate judicial inquiry into the real pur
poses of a governmental entity in instituting a restriction on
protected activity:' Since there was no record of an aesthetic
purpose underlying the ordinance, the court refused to accept
the city's after-the-fact claim that they considered portable
signs aesthetically displeasing.11 It is doubtful that Vincent
would effect any change in this argument. Thus, while cities
need not demonstrate that their sign controls will achieve
their aesthetic objectives, they do need to invoke aesthetics
as a purpose for the regulation before enactment and should
not rely on citing aesthetics as an after-the-fact justification
for a challenged ordinance.
Traffic Safety as a Justification for Sign Controls
In Metromedia, seven Justices agreed that government did
not have to demonstrate a connection between sign controls
and traffic safety. As in the case of aesthetics, Justices Bren
nan and Blackmun disagreed. The majority's view was based
upon the fact that studies of the effects of advertising signs
on traffic safety have reached different conclusions. Under
these circumstances, the majority reasoned, courts should
defer to legislative judgments.
This view has been followed by a number of state and
federal courts.12 But in three cases we discussed earlier,
10. Vincent and Southern New Jersey Newspaper shared another issue
that was not discussed previously. In both cases, those challenging the regu
lation claimed that public streets and sidewalks-the location of both the
vending machines and the political signs-were "public forums" and occupy
a special position in First Amenchnent law. The majority in Vinamt, although
acknowledging the general validity of the public forum doctrine, found that
the government could legitimately restrict expression in a public forum "as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to sup
press expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view:'
(citation omitted) 52 U.S.L.W. at 4601.
11. See also Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F.Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982),
35 ZD 208.
12. See, for example, Temple Baptist Church v. City of Albuquerque,
646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982).
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Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Marietta, and Vincent
(Ninth Circuit opinion), the courts looked to the Brennan
opinion in Metromedia to support a requirement that govern
ment offer proof of the connection between traffic safety and
sign controls. In Vincent (Ninth Circuit), no proof was
offered, while in Southern New Jersey Newspapers and
Marietta, the court rejected the proof as insufficient.
The Marietta case illustrates the extent of court review.
The city ordinance there limited the display of portable signs
to no longer than 120 days. To prove the connection between
the ordinance and traffic safety, a city police officer testified
that portable signs constitute a greater distraction to
motorists than permanent signs because drivers become
accustomed to permanent signs and ignore them while a port
able sign indicated "something-probably a special" and
drew attention. The court decided that the ordinance did not
further the city's interest in traffic safety because, based on
the officer's testimony, the 120-day limitation only exacer
bated the distracting quality of portable signs.
Traffic safety as a justification for sign regulation was only
tangentially mentioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vin
cent; the majority opinion focused solely on the aesthetics
issue. Given the majority's strong rejection of strict judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments regarding aesthetics, how
ever, we can infer that the Court would likewise reject the
level of judicial inquiry conducted by the Marietta court. On
a practical level, the traffic safety issue should not influence
many decisions because the judgment will more likely turn
on the aesthetics issue.
Distinctions Between On-Site and Off-Site Signs
Metromedia approved government's distinguishing be
tween on-site and off-site signs in sign control regulations.
The validity of such a distinction has been at issue in a num
ber of subsequent cases. The distinction has recently been
approved by courts in Florida, North Carolina, Minnesota,
Maryland, and Massachusetts.13 These decisions usually note
that there are practical and valid distinctions between the
two kinds of signs, justifying their separate classifications.
Some courts have gone so far as to take judicial notice that
off-site advertising is more intrusive and obnoxious than on
site advertising.14
The on-site/off-site distinction was not an issue in the Vin
cent case. While some courts have struck down municipal
sign ordinances that distinguished between on-site and off
site signs, the distinction itself was not the controlling fac
tor in these cases.15 It appears that the distinction does not
pose any problems in sign ordinances.
Distinctions Between Commercial and Noncommercial Signs
The Metromedia plurality, while allowing San Diego to
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial signs,
would not uphold a sign ordinance that regulated noncom
mercial speech more strictly than commercial speech. The
'
13. See, for example, Maurice Callahan & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising
Board, 427 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. App. 1981).
14. See cases cited in Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of
Ormond Beach, 415 So.2d 13U, 1317, n. 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
34 ZD 321.

plurality's reasoning has been used by a number of ~~urts
that have upheld the legitimacy of the com111er
cial/noncommercial distinction but struck down sign r1:?gu
lations that favor commercial over noncommercial .speech.
In Metromedia, Inc v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F.Supp.
1193 (D. Md. 1982), the ordinance, which was limited tQ'one
area of the city, prohibited all off-site signs and permit,ted
only those on-site signs that identified the occupant or use
of the building. The court found the ordinance invalid since
it permitted a building owner or occupant to use a sign to
identify his premises but not to display his ideas or those
of others. In City of Antioch v. Candidates Outdoor Graphic
Service, 557 F.Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982), 35 ZD 277, the
court invalidated an ordinance that imposed a 60-day time
limit on political signs. The court, noting that such limits
were not imposed on "temporary signs advertising upcom
ing commercial, charitable, or civic events;' found thanhe
city had impermissibly regulated temporary political signs
more stringently than temporary commercial signs. Similar
decisions have been handed down in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and New Jersey.16 Because 'the Vincent decision did not
involve a distinction between commercial and noncommer
cial signs-the Los Angeles ordinance banned all signs on
public property-it will have no effect on these cases.
Conclusion and Guidelines for Planners
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Metromedia and Vin
cent, along with the substantial number of state and federal
court decisions, clearly validate municipal efforts to address
aesthetic and traffic safety objectives through sign controls.
Planners must be cautious, however, when sign controls re
strict freedom of expression, distinguish among similar types
of signs according to their content, or give more protection
to commercial than noncommercial signs. Further, despite
the strong trend towards upholding aesthetics alone as a basis
for an exercise of the police power, not all states follow this
rule and planners should ascertain the state of the law in
their own jurisdictions before basing an ordinance solely on
aesthetic grounds.
For planners who want to eliminate billboards (off-site
signs) and regulate other signs, the cases suggest the follow
ing types of ordinance:
• Prohibit all off-site commercial signs;
• Regulate the "time, place, or manner" of both off-site non
commercial signs and all on-site signs;
• Avoid exceptions to the ordinance.
Any such ordinance should clearly state the purposes for
which it has been enacted and might even note how the
ordinance will assist in achieving those purposes. If there
are exceptions to the ordinance, the reasons for each indivi
dual exception should be clearly stated, with no '1aundry
list" of exempt signs. Be absolutely sure that the ordinance
does not have the effect of regulating noncommmercial
speech more strictly than commercial speech, as can easily
occur when you ban off-site signs and restrict on-site signs
to identification of the activity conducted on the premises.
16. See, for example, Singer Supermarkets v. Zoning Board of Adjust
ment, 443 A.2d 1082 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1982), 34 ZD 264.

15. See Central Advertising Co. v. St. Joseph Township, 337 N.W.2d 15
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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